




Engaged in by Transnational
Enterprises: A Prognosis
I. Introduction
There is current and virtually unanimous agreement that an international
convention would be the most effective means of curtailing restrictive business
practices engaged in by transnational enterprises (TNEs). However, there is
considerable disagreement as to what types of enterprises should be deemed
"transnational," what types of business practices should be classified as
"restrictive" and what type of international convention would be appropriate.
The purpose of this article is to analyze these areas of disagreement, to explore
the effect on TNEs of the absence of an international convention and to develop
a prognosis for an international convention regulating restrictive business
practices.
At the outset it is important to remember that many of the disagreements we
will be discussing can be traced to the symbolism attached to the TNE by
various participants in the relevant international debates.
To the developing nations the TNE is the prime symbol of foreign interference
in their domestic economic, political and social life. These nations blame their
lack of development on past and continuing exploitation and interference by the
TNE and, in many cases, its government of origin. The following list of the
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complaints made by developing countries against the TNEs was recently
published by The Economist:
It fiddles its accounts. It avoids or evades its taxes. It rigs its intra-company transfer
prices. It is run by foreigners, from decision centres thousands of miles away. It imports
foreign labour practices. It doesn't import foreign labour practices. It overpays. It
underpays. It competes unfairly with local firms. It is in cahoots with local firms. It
exports jobs from rich countries. It is an instrument of rich countries' imperialism. The
technologies it brings to the third world are old-fashioned. No, they are too modern. It
meddles. It bribes. Nobody can control it. It wrecks balances of payments. It overturns
economic policies. It plays off governments against each other to get the biggest
investment incentives. Won't it please come and invest? Let it bloody well go home.'
As a result of these perceptions of the TNEs one of the principal goals of the
developing countries' program to establish a "New International Economic
Order" 2 is the control of abuses perpetrated by them. Such control would be
accomplished by general "codes of conduct" for TNEs and specific regulations
governing restrictive business practices3 and the transfer of technology.4 Such
new regulatory devices are deemed to be necessary because the developing
nations believe that the existing restrictive business practices legislation in
developed nations is designed to deal only with the domestic effects of TNE
conduct. This "neutrality" of developed country legislation toward the effects of
restrictive business practices engaged in by TNEs beyond national borders
allegedly encourages an increase of restrictive business practices in developing
countries. Thus, for example, one developing country member of the Second
Ad-Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices convened by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently
noted that:
[R]estrictive business practices legislation in developed countries was normally based on
the concept of maintaining or introducing competition. Competition, however,
presupposed some sort of essential equality amongst the parties concerned but this was
'Controlling the Multinationals, TnHE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1976, at 68. See Commission on
Transnational Corporations, Report on the Second Session, Annexs I, II & III, U.N. Doc. E/5782;
E/C. 10/16 (1-12 March 1976) which contain lists of "areas of concern regarding the operations and
activities of transnational corporations."
'Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U.N. GAOR, 6th
Special Sess., A/RES/3201 (S-VI), adopted I May 1974. See Symposium on the New International
Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 233 (1976). See also, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1974); Haight, The New International
Economic Orderand the Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L. LAW. 591 (1975).
'See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 7th Special Sess., A/RES/3362 (S-VII), adopted 16 Sept. 1975 which
provides in part:
Restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, particularly that of
developing countries, should be eliminated and efforts should be made at the national and
international levels with the objective of negotiating a set of equitable principles and rules.
'For proposed drafts offered by the Group of 77 see UNCTAD/TD/B/C.6/AC. 1/L.1/Rev.,1 (16
May 1975) and UNCTAD/TD/B/C.6/AC.1/L.6 (24 Nov. 1975). For counter drafts offered by the
Group B nations see UNCTAD/TD/B/C.6/AC.1/L.2 (9 May 1975) and UNCTAD/TD/B/C.6/
AC.1/L.5 (24 Nov. 1975).
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not the case in regard to relationships between developed and developing countries. It
was a handicapped race between unequals.'
In contrast, the developed nations tend to see the TNE as a symbol of the
advantages of capitalism and of the increasing economic interdependence of
nations. They generally believe that, except for occasional exceptions of abuse,
the TNE plays an important and useful role in itnernational economic relations
and in domestic, economic and social progress. Nearly all of the developed
countries6 recently adopted the following statement concerning TNEs which is
contained in the first paragraph of the "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" promulgated in June 1976 by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Through international direct investment, such enterprises can bring substantial
benefits to home and host countries by contributing to the efficient utilization of capital,
technology and human resources between countries and can thus fulfill an important
role in the promotion of economic and social welfare.'
Moreover, one of the United States governmental delegates to UNCTAD's
Second Ad-Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices recently
noted that "[t]here is little or no hard evidence that multinational corporations
commit a great number of antitrust violations, or more than they used to, or
more than purely national firms of the same size." 8
This is not to say that the developed nations view TNEs as above reproach.
On the contrary, the OECD is comprised of developed nations whose "Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises" above referenced include provisions
relating to restrictive business practices. In addition, Secretary Kissinger stated
in his address to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General
Assembly:
The United States therefore believes that the time has come for the international
community to articulate standards of conduct for both enterprises and governments.
'Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
UNCTAD/TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (8 March 1976), at 7-8. [hereinafter cited as Report of the Second Ad
Hoc Group of Experts]. For previous studies see Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices on Its First Session, UNCTAD/TD/B/C.2/AC.5/R.1 (20-24 Oct.
1975); Report by the [First] Ad Hoc Group of Experts, Restrictive Business Practices in Relation to
the Trade and Development of Developing Countries U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/119/Rev. 1 (1974); R.
VERNON, THE OPERATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL UNITED STATES ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES U.N. Doc. TD/B/399 (1972).
'The 23 members of OECD that participated are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
7OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, para. 1 (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L L. MATS.
969 (1976) and 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 83 (1976). -
'Address by Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing
World, Dallas. Texas, June 15, 1976, at 7.
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He then added that in addition to a statement of general principles:
Laws against restrictive business practices must be developed, better coordinated
among countries, and enforced. The United States has long been vigilant against such
abuses in domestic trade, mergers, or licensing of technology. We stand by the same
principles internationally. We condemn restrictive practices in setting prices or
restraining supplies, whether by private or state-owned transnational enterprises or by
the collusion of national governments. 9
Nevertheless, the dispute between developed and developing nations over the
content, coverage and type of international convention needed to correct
restrictive business practices is inextricably tied to differing perceptions of the
TNEs, their activities and the aspirations of the respective nation.
Consequently, the symbolic importance of the TNEs must be kept in mind when
evaluating specific proposals or conventions.
II. Defining "Transnational" Enterprises
Despite the innumerable studies, reports, books, articles and papers devoted
to the topic, there is still no international consensus as to the definition of the oft
used term "transnational enterprise." In fact, one of the five items on the
"programme of work" of the United Nations Commission on Transnational
Corporations is the establishment of a definition of "transnational corpora-
tion." 0 There is thus far not even agreement on the words to be defined.
Various U.N. Reports refer to "multinational corporations," "transnational
corporations," and "transnational enterprises." Other frequently used words
include "multinational enterprises" and "international corporations." For the
sake of consistency we have opted to use the term "transnational enterprise"
which was recommended in the Report of the U.N.'s Group of Eminent Persons"
as being the most appropriate.
That Report also contained the following definition of "multinational
corporations":
[E]nterprises which own or control production or service facilities outside the country in
which they are based. Such enterprises are not always incorporated or private; they can
also be co-operatives or state-owned entities.' 2
'Address by Secretary of State Kissinger (delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan) New York, Sept. 1,
1975, at 8. See also J. LAPALOMBARA & S. BLANK, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL
ELITES: A STUDY IN TENSIONS (The Conference Board 1976); Kissinger, Statement before the OECD
Council, The Cohesion of the Industrial Democracies: The Precondition of Global Progress (June
21. 1976) 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 73 (1976): Kissinger, Address before the Fourth Ministerial Meeting
of UNCTAD, Nairobi, Kenya (May 6, 1976). For dissenting views see Nehemkis, Supranational
Control of the International Corporation: A Dissenting View, 10 CAL. WEST L. REV. 286 (1974);
Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAw & POL.
INT'L Bus. 1 (1971).
"
0Report of Second Session, supra note 1, at 2; Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report
on the First Session, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/5655; E/C.10/6 (17-28 March 1975).
"Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on
Development and on International Relations 25 n.2 (1974); U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1; ST/ESA/6.
"Id. at 25. For other definitions see U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTI-
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The participants at the First and Second Sessions of the United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations were unable to agree on the use of
this, or any other definition. Some delegations contended that state-owned
enterprises should not be included within the definition because such enter-
prises are "not mainly geared to profit-making."' 3 Others thought such a
distinction was inappropriate. Another contended point concerned the necessity
of formulating a definition based on the structural characteristics of an enter-
prise. It has been cogently argued that agreements between two independent
entities, such as classic cartel arrangements, have the same effects as intra-
enterprise agreements.'" Nevertheless, many developing countries want to
impose structural definitions in order to keep activities of state-owned or state-
controlled cartels beyond the reach of any new regulation of restrictive business
practices. II
This lack of an agreed definition of "transnational enterprise" is a signifi-
cant, but not formidable problem. Many developing nations simply take the
view that any international convention should cover only those enterprises whose
activities give rise to the concerns expressed by the developing nations. 16 In any
event, it seems clear that the lack of an agreed definition will not hinder rapid
development of proposed conventions.
HI. "Restrictive" Business Practices
Attaining broad international agreement as to those business practices which
should be classified as "restrictive" has proven to be even more difficult than
resolution of the threshold definitional problems. Since 1945 more than 20
nations have enacted restrictive business practices legislation, 7 and several
international conventions pertaining to restrictive business practices have been
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 118-21 (1973); U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190;
Aharoni, On theDefinition ofa Multinational Corporation, Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus., Autumn 1971, at
17.
"Report of Second Session, supra note 1, at 14-15; Report of First Session, supra note 10, at 12.
"See Rubin, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Economic Relations, 70
AMER... INT'L L. 73, 84-86 (1976); Rubin, International Rules for Transnational Corporations, I J.
INT'L TRADE L. 1 (1975).
"The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 2, contains several provisions
justifying commodity cartels. Id. Arts. 5 & 6. For background see Joelson and Griffin, The Legal
Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INr'L
LAW. 617 (1975); Brower and Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 314-16 (1975).
"Report of First Session, supra note 10, at 12.
"See, e.g., OECD, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices (4th ed. 1976);
Business International, Europe's Rules of Competition (1976); UNCTAD Secretariat, Control of
Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America, UNCTAD/ST/MD/4 (1975), reprinted in 21
Antitrust Bull. 137 (1976); UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Major Developments in the Area of
Restrictive Business Practices, UNCTAD/TD/B/C.2/159 (1975), reprinted in 20 ANTITRUST BULL.
887 (1975); UNCTAD Secretariat, Laws and Regulations Relating to the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices, UNCTAD/TD/B/C.2/AC.5/Misc. 1 (1975).
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drafted. Given these facts, it may appear incongruous that there should still be
considerable dispute as to which business practices are "restrictive." 18 This
incongruity has several explanations which will be discussed following a brief
historical review of past efforts to achieve international agreement."9
A. Historical Review
After World War I the League of Nations studied the possibility of inter-
national controls for cartels and industrial agreements.2" However, no action
was taken because: (1) national policies were too diverse to harmonize, (2) many
nations objected to the loss of sovereignty inherent in effective international
control, and (3) many nations believed that cartels were very efficient and there-
fore, beneficial. 21
Before the end of World War 11 the United States began to formulate plans
for an International Trade Organization (ITO) which would have regulated
many facets of international trade including restrictive business practices.22
After several years of work a proposed charter was adopted in Havana in 1948.
Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter would have prohibited "business practices
affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to
markets, or foster monopolistic control."23 The following list of restrictive
business practices was included in the Charter:
(a) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others in the
purchase, sale or lease of any product;
(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial market or field
of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase
quotas;
(c) discriminating against particular enterprises;
(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas;
(e) preventing by agreement the development or application of technology or invention
whether patented or unpatented;
(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trademarks or copyrights granted by any
member to matters which, according to its laws and regulations, are not within the
scope of such grants, or to products or conditions or production, use or sale which
are likewise not the subjects of such grants.2 '
"The term "restrictive business practices" is more widely accepted than is the American term
"antitrust" which has a peculiar historical derivation. See I E. KINTNER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS Ch. 1 (1977) for a discussion of the origins of the Sherman Act.
"See text at note 46, infra.
2
°See, e.g., CASSEL, RECENT MONOPOLISTIC TRENDS IN INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1927.11.36);
MACGREGOR, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1927.11.16); OUALID, THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS (C.E.C.P. 94. 1926).
"International Economic Conference, Final Report 44 (1927) (C.E.I. 44. 1927.11.46); Economic
Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the 37th Session (1932) (20.1.32).
"Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, State Dept. Pub. 2411, Commercial
Policy Series 79 (1945); Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United
Nations. State Dept. Pub. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 (1946).
"Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Art. 46(1), State Dept. Pub. 3206,
Commercial Policy Series 114 (1948).
"Id. Art. 46(3).
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. I
Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices 11
Although this Charter was signed by more than 50 countries it was abandoned
after the United States withdrew its support. This reversal in United States
policy was apparently caused by objections to provisions relating to interna-
tional commodity agreements, foreign investment and full employment. The
restrictive business practices provisions were not the subject of significant
United States criticism."5
The Havana Charter's list of restrictive business practices, reprinted above,
was repeated almost exactly 6 in the 1953 United Nations Draft Convention on
the prevention and control of restrictive business practices in international
trade.27 This Draft Convention was drafted by an Ad Hoc Committee on
Restrictive Business Practices and was endorsed by seven countries." Neverthe-
less, it died when the United States Department of State withdrew its support
because "sufficient degree of agreement on fundamentals does not now exist" to
make the Convention practicable or effective in accomplishing the elimination
of restrictive business practices in international trade.2 9
With the death of the Ad Hoc Committee's Draft Convention, several nations
attempted to have restrictive business practices included within the purview of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).30 After several years of
study a group of experts appointed by the members of GATT concluded only
that:
it would be unrealistic to recommend at present a multilateral agreement for the control
of international restrictive business practices. The necessary consensus among countries
"For detailed background see Hearings on H.J. Res. 236 "Membership and Participation by the
United States in the International Trade Organization" before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Edwards, Regulation on Monopolistic Cartelization, 14 OHIo ST. L.J.
252 (1953); Diebold, The End of the ITO, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 16, Princeton
Univ., Oct. 1952.
"The provision on suppression of technology, Art. 46(3)(e) was broadened to include situations
where the suppression was the result of coercion by a single firm or would have the result "of
monopolizing an industrial or commercial field." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive
Business Practices to the Economic and Social Council, 16 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 11, at 6 (1953);
E/2380 and E/AC.37/3.
"Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 26, at Annex II, Art. 1, para. 3.
"Sweden, E/2612, May 28, 1954; Belgium, E/2612, May 28, 1954; Norway, E/2612/Add. 2,
April 4, 1955, at 3-4; Federal Republic of Germany, E/2612/Add. 3, April 15, 1955, at 3-5;
Turkey, Summary Records, 85Sth Meeting, May 26, 1955, at 5-7; Yugoslavia, ibid, at 10-13; India,
Summary Records, 856th Meeting, May 24, 1955, at 4, Norway, Germany, Turkey, Yugoslavia and
India favored administration of the agreement within the general framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
"Comment submitted pursuant to Economic and Social Council Resolution 487 (XVI) of 31 July
1953, E/2612/Add. 2, April 4, 1955, at 4-5; Summary Records, 856th Meeting of Council, May 25,
1955, at 6-7. For background see Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject
for United Nations Action, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 409 (1955); Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices,
2 AM. J. CoMp. L. 445 (1953); Kopper, The International Regulation of Cartels-Current
Proposals, 40 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1954); Montague, Limitations on What UN Can Do Successfully:
The Proposed UN Program on Restrictive Business Practices, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 441 (1955).
"See GATT Doc. L/283 (1954) (proposal of Denmark, Norway & Sweden); GATT Doc.
L/261/Add. 1, at 41 (1954) (West Germany).
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upon which such an agreement could be based did not yet exist, and countries did not yet
have sufficient experience of action in this field to devise an effective control
procedure.3
In 1959 this group recommended and the GATT adopted a Decision providing
for the establishment of direct governmental consultations whenever a
Contracting Party believes that it is being harmed by restrictive business
practices engaged in by enterprises of another Contracting Party.32
The most successful international agreements concerning restrictive business
practices have been those of the European Common Market. In 1951 the six
original members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed a
treaty regulating restrictive agreements and concentrations in the coal and steel
industry." Six years later the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic
Community (EEC) prohibited a broader range of restrictive business practices
in all industry."' Article 85 of the EEC Treaty prohibits agreements, decisions
and concerted practices:
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and
in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Article 86 prohibits an abuse by one or more enterprises of a dominant
position within all or a substantial part of the European Common Market. The
Article contains the following examples of such abuse:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers,
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial use,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
These provisions have proved to be the most successful effort at international
regulation of restrictive business practices because the treaty provisions super-
3GATT, Basic Instruments & Documents 171 (9th Supp. 1961).
"Id. at 28. For background see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 20.3
(1969); C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 238 (1976); GATT, Restrictive
Business Practices GATT/1959-2 (1959).
33261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957). See Arts. 65-67.
1'298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
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sede inconsistent national laws and are administered by a "supranational"
Commission and Court. 35
Another example of regional international agreement on restrictive business
practices is the Investment Code of the Andean Common Market (Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). 36 Decision 24 of the Andean
Commission, 37 adopted in December 1970, contains Articles which enumerate
restrictive business practices which may not be included in patent 38 or trade-
mark licenses. 39 To date only a few Andean Group countries have adopted the
"For detailed discussions see C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION
(1973); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC (1973); C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEISS
& M. HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW (2d ed. 1971); COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Rahl]; A. DERINGER,
THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1968).
"Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration (May 26, 1969), [1970] 2 Registro Oficial No.
345; translated in 8 INT'L L. MATS. 910 (1969).
"Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and
Royalties, (Dec. 31, 1970), [1971] Registro Oficial No. 264; translated in 11 INT'L L. MATS. 126
(1972).
"Id. Art. 20.
Article 20. Member Countries shall not authorize the conclusion of contracts for the transfer of
foreign technology or patents which contain:
(a) Clauses by virtue of which the furnishing of technology imposes the obligation for the
recipient country or enterprise to acquire from a specific source capital goods, intermediate
products, raw materials, and other technologies or of permanently employing personnel
indicated by the enterprise which supplies the technology. In exceptional cases, the recipient
country may accept clauses of this nature for the acquisition of capital goods, intermediate
products or raw materials, provided that their price corresponds to current levels in the inter-
national market;
(b) Clauses pursuant to which the enterprise selling the technology reserves the right to fix the
sale or resale prices of the products manufactured on the basis of the technology;
(c) Clauses that contain restrictions regarding the volume and structure of production;
(d) Clauses that prohibit the use of competitive technologies;
(e) Clauses that establish a full or partial purchase option in favor of the supplier of the tech-
nology;
(f) Clauses that obligate the purchaser of technology to transfer to the supplier the inventions or
improvements that may be obtained through the use of the technology;
(g) Clauses that require payment of royalties to the owners of patents for patents which are not
used; and
(h Other clauses with equivalent effects.
Save in exceptional cases, duly appraised by the competent authority of the recipient country, no
clauses shall be accepted in which exportation of the products manufactured on the basis of the
technology is prohibited or limited in any way.
In no way shall clauses of this nature be accepted in connection with subregional trade or the
exportation of similar products to third countries.
"Id. Art. 25
Article 25. Licensing contracts for the utilitization of trademarks of foreign origin in the territory of
the Member Countries may not contain certain restrictive clauses such as:
(a) Prohibition or limitation of the exportation or sale in certain countries of the products manu-
factured under the trademark concerned, or similar products;
(b) Obligation to use raw materials, intermediate goods, and equipment supplied by the owner of
the trademark or his affiliates. In exceptional cases, the recipient country may accept clauses
of this nature provided the prices correspond to current levels on the international market;
(c) Fixing of sale or resale prices of the products manufactured under the trademark;
(d) Obligation to pay royalties to the owner of the trademark for unused trademarks;
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national mechanisms such as screening, evaluation and approval of licenses
necessary to implement Decision 24.40
The most recent international effort to devise an agreement regulating TNE
restrictive business practices was the OECD's June 1976 promulgation of non-
binding "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" which contain the following
provisions on "Competition."
Enterprises should while conforming to official competition rules and established
policies of the countries in which they operate,
(1) refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition in the relevant market
by abusing a dominant position of market power, by means of, for example,
(a) anti-competitive acquisitions,
(b) predatory behaviour toward competitors,
(c) unreasonable refusal to deal,
(d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial property rights,
(e) discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differentiated) pricing and using such pricing
transactions between affiliated enterprises as a means of affecting adversely
competition outside these enterprises;
(2) allow purchases, distributors and licensees freedom to resell, export, purchase and
develop their operation, consistent with law, trade conditions, the need for
specialization and sound commercial practice;
(3) refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening the restrictive
effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive agreements which adversely
affect or eliminate competition and which are not generally or specifically accepted
under applicable national or international legislation.' 1
This brief historical review reveals that the successful attempts to reach inter-
national agreement on those business practices which should be classified as
"restrictive" 2 have been those among countries at the same developmental
level. The developed countries have reached agreement in the OECD and in the
European Communities. The developing countries have reached agreement in
the Andean Common Market and in their "Group of 77" proposals to various
U.N. agencies. Attempts to reach a consensus of both developed and developing
countries have failed to achieve more than the GATT's relatively weak
provisions relating to voluntary consultation.
(e) Obligation permanently to employ personnel supplied or indicated by the owner of the trade-
mark; and
(f) Other obligations of equivalent effect.
'"UNIDO Secretariat, Review of Systems for Regulation, 11 les Nouvelles 29, 34 (1976). For back-
ground see Mirabito. The Control of Technology Transfer: The Burke-Hartke Legislation and the
Andean Foreign Investment Code: The MNE Faces the Nations, 9 INT'L LAW. 215 (1975); Schill,
The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L
Bus. 437 (1974); Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Invest-
ment, 5 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 313 (1972).
4'OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Annex, supra
note 7.2For more detailed discussions see Rahl, supra note 35, at 417-39; Joelson, The Proposed Inter-
national Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus.
__ (1977); Furnish, A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, 4 INT'L LAW.
317 (1970); Focsaneanu, Les Practiques Commerciales Restrictives et le Droit International,
ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 266 (1964).
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 1
Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices 15
B. Current Disputes
This lack of a broad international consensus continues to exist and is
reflected in the March 1976 Report of UNCTAD's Second Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.4 3 These experts drew up a list of
restrictive business practices "which are likely to adversely affect (sic) the trade
and development of developing countries." 44 The experts from the developed
countries thought that guidance for interpreting this list should include the
definition of "restrictive business practices" contained in the Havana Charter,
(i.e. practices "which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster
monopolistic control"). The experts from the developing countries and from a
"socialist country of Eastern Europe" believed that the Havana Charter
definition was inappropriate because it "would not enable the dynamic nature
of such practices and the objectives of Governments in controlling them, to be
taken fully into account, especially in regard to the adverse effects of such
practices on developing countries." '45
'
3Report of Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5.
"Id. at 18-19.
Restrictive business practices which may affect trade and development of developing countries.
[footnotes omitted]
1. International cartels
(a) Agreements fixing price as to exports and imports;
(b) Collusive tendering;
(c) Market or customer allocation arrangements;
(d) Allocation by quota as to sales and production;
(e) Collective action to enforce arrangements-e.g., by boycotts;
(f) Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association, which is crucial to compe-
tition.
2. National external trade cartels
(a) Agreements fixing price as to exports and imports;
(b) Collusive tendering;
(c) Market or customer allocation arrangements;
(d) Allocation by quota as to sales and production;
(e) Collective action to enforce arrangements-e.g., by boycotts;
(f) Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association, which is crucial to compe-
tition.
3. Domestic restrictive practices
(a) Price fixing and rebate cartels, collusive tendering, resale price maintenance, and other
collusive arrangements;
(b) Collective boycotts;
(c) Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association, which is crucial to compe-
tition.
4. Acquisition or abuse of market power by
(a) Anti-competitive exclusive dealing, and anti-competitive refusal to deal, including those
by parents or subsidiaries;
(b) Unnecessarily tied sales or purchases;
(c) Predatory or discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differentiated) pricing whether accom-
plished by transfer pricing or otherwise;
(d) Anti-competitive mergers, takeovers, or other acquisitions of control of a horizontal,
vertical and conglomerate nature.
"Id. at 18 n.1.
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This list of restrictive business practices contains several footnotes delineating
disputes between the experts as to the meaning and scope of certain listed
practices. The Report states that "[tihe list is neither exhaustive nor does the
order of the list reflect any sequential importance in terms of the practices, nor
does the list presuppose any conclusion as to how the practices should be
controlled under national or international regulation." '46
There are three principal reasons for this lack of agreement between
developed and developing countries as to which business practices should be
classified as "restrictive."
First, the majority of nations participating in the present efforts to reach
international agreement on the control of restrictive business practices have no
domestic restrictive business practices legislation and no experience in
administering or enforcing such legislation.
Second, several of the objectives which the developing countries are seeking to
attain via an agreement on restrictive business practices are deemed to be
inappropriate by the developed countries. For example, the developing
countries are seeking preferential treatment for their enterprises and would thus
permit domestic and government controlled enterprises to engage in many of
the practices that would be illegal if they were engaged in by TNEs. 7 The
developed countries favor the prohibition of enumerated restrictive business
practices regardless of the type of enterprise that engages in such conduct. 8
In addition, other objectives sought to be attained by the developing countries
via an international agreement on restrictive business practices include: a more
equitable distribution of wealth, the control of prices and inflation, the
protection and assistance of small-scale enterprises, an increase of employment
opportunities, and increased participation by nationals in domestic markets.
The developed nations believe that these objectives should be attained via tax,
welfare, wage-price, and investment laws.4 9
Third, despite the many years of international consultations and studies in
the field of restrictive business practices there still exist significantly different
viewpoints in this area which reflect variations in national policies. The
competition policy of a nation necessarily reflects that nation's legal traditions
and political and economic perceptions. Thus, there is still considerable
disagreement among even developed nations as to which business practices
should be classified as "restrictive." For example, the enforcement officials in
the European Common Market are much more concerned with abuse of market
power than with incipient limitations on competition through mergers.
"Id. at 20.
'"See note 15, supra.
4'See text at note 9, supra.
4'Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 29.
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Consequently, it is illegal in the Common Market for a firm with a dominant
market position to charge excessive prices, to earn an excessive profit or to
refuse to deal. United States antitrust law has no similar direct control over
prices, profits or individual refusals to deal. 0 Conversely, mergers which would
be struck down under United States laws as anti-competitive might not even be
questioned by European authorities because they favor the creation of
"European size" companies to compete with large American and Japanese
companies."
These significant variations among developed nations although significant,
nonetheless appear trivial when compared to the disagreements among the
developed and developing nations. The restrictive business practices legislation
of developed nations focuses upon practices which limit or distort competition.
The legislation in and proposals of developing countries tend to focus upon
practices which restrict their exports or perpetuate their "exploitation" by the
TNEs and/or the developed countries. Developing countries are very concerned
with intra-enterprise relationships, particularly market allocations and transfer
pricing. They have sought to include within the definition of "restrictive"
business practices agreements between members of the same corporate family.
A much more lenient view toward intra-enterprise agreements is usually taken
by developed country jurisprudence.5 2
These differences in national restrictive business practices legislation are so
significant and deeply rooted that the Secretary of the U.N.'s Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on Restrictive Business Practices, which prepared the 1953 Draft Convention
discussed earlier in this article, 5 3 recently stated that "[tihe notion that national
antitrust legislation and administration can be modified so as to achieve
uniform national standards is quite unrealistic."5 "
This leads us to an analysis of the disputes concerning the type of
international convention that should be adopted to control restrictive business
practices engaged in by TNEs.
"°See generally, Jones, American Anti-Trust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspec-
tive, 90 L.Q. REV. 191 (1974); Rhinelander, The Roche Case: One Giant Step for British Antitrust,
1S VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974); Hawk, Antitrust in the EEC-The First Decade, 41 FoRDHAm L. REV.
229 (1972).
"See generally, Commission of the European Communities, Third Report on Competition Policy
28-38 (1974); Hood, The European Company Proposal, 22 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 434 (1973); D.
SWANN & D. McLACHLAN, CONCENTRATION OR COMPETITION: A EUROPEAN DILEMMA? (1967);
Europe Likes Them Big, FORBES, May 15, 1974, at 112; Siekman, Europe's Love Affair with
Bigness. FORTUNE, March 1970, at 95.
"Compare Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, supra note 11, at 70 and The Views of the
United States Government Concerning the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, at 30-31.
"See text at note 26, supra.
"Timberg, An International Antitrust Convention: A Proposal to Harmonize Conflicting
National Policies Towards the Multi-National Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 157, 164 (1973).
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IV. What Type of International Convention Is Appropriate?
There are three principal disagreements as to what type of international
convention regulating restrictive business practices engaged in by TNEs would
be appropriate.
The first disagreement is whether the convention should contain general
principles and specific rules or just general principles. A comparison of the
OECD Guidelines and the Group of 77s UNCTAD proposals reveals the
magnitude of this disagreement.
The OECD Guidelines relating to Competition contain four short paragraphs
written in general terms. For example, enterprises should refrain from "anti-
competitive abuse of industrial property rights.""5 On the other hand, within
UNCTAD there is a separate group of experts which deals solely with transfers
of technology, 56 and the developing countries have proposed within that forum
an international code of conduct on transfer of technology which contains a list
of 40 restrictive business practices related to industrial property rights which
should be prohibited. 7
The OECD's brief Guidelines may also be compared with the previously
noted list of 19 "Restrictive Business Practices Which are Likely to Adversely
Affect the Trade and Development of Developing Countries"5 8 prepared by
UNCTAD's Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.
These experts stated in their Report that "the practices-listed were broader than
those at present treated under any one system of legislation. . .. "'
As of this writing, this dispute as to the appropriate degree of specificity for
an international convention on restrictive business practices is unresolved.
Pursuant to Resolutions adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of UNCTAD in
May 1976 a third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
will meet with the goal of "formulating a set of multilaterally agreed equitable
principles and rules for the control of restrictive business practices having
adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing countries,
and on the economic development of those countries." 6 The Committee on
"See note 7, supra.
sThe issue of restrictive business practices is under the jurisdiction of UNCTAD's Committee on
Manufacturers. A separate UNCTAD Committee on Transfer of Technology was created in 1974.
Each Committee has its own Intergovernmental Group of Experts.
"Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology
submitted by Brazil on behalf of the Group of 77, UNCTAD/TD/B/C.6/AC. I/L. 1/Rev. 1, at 7-9 (16
May 1975). For background and developments see Report of UNCTAD on its 4th Session 122-26,
TD/217 (1976); W. Chudson, The Acquisition of Technology From Multinational Corporations by
Developing Countries, U.M. Doc. ST/ESA/12 (1974). UNCTAD Secretariat, The Possibility and
Feasibility of an International Code of Conduct in the Field of Transfer of Technology TD/B/AC. 11 /
L.12 (1974).
"See note 44, supra.
"Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 20.
'
0UNCTAD Report on 4th Session, supra note 57, at 10-11; UNCTAD, Provisional Agenda for
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Transfer of Technology will also continue its work in drafting an international
code of conduct for the transfer of technology "corresponding, in particular, to
the special needs of the developing countries.6
The second disagreement over the nature of an international convention
governing restrictive business practices is whether the convention should deal
with the actions of TNEs only, or with those of home and host governments as
well. Here again a comparison of the OECD Guidelines and the developing
country UNCTAD proposals is instructive.
The OECD Guidelines for TNEs were negotiated as one part of a three part
package concerning foreign direct investment.6 The other two parts of this
package, which were adopted by the OECD simultaneously with the Guidelines,
involved Declarations by the OECD Member Countries that they will: (1) grant
foreign owned enterprises operating in their territory "national treatment", i.e.,
treatment no less favorable than that accorded in similar situations to domestic
enterprises, and (2) take each others' interests into account in their actions
concerning international investment incentives and disincentives. 63
To date no similar "package" has been proposed in UNCTAD. 64 As
previously noted, 65 the developing nations take the position that they should be
permitted to authorize or to undertake restrictive business practices that would
be prohibited if engaged in by TNEs. According to one member of the United
States delegation to UNCTAD's Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices:
Experts from countries with strong antitrust traditions attempted to convince the
delegates from developing countries that cartel practices are in the long run injurious
and debilitating even to those who perpetrate them, and not only to the victims. This
was a difficult point to sell in light of the enormous short run profits of OPEC. Perhaps
the easier point to get across was that the developed nations are simply not prepared to
sign a one-sided international agreement. 
6
The third disagreement concerning an international convention on restrictive
business practices involves the legal nature of such a convention. The
developing countries want the convention to be legally binding. Most developed
countries insist that the convention, like the OECD Guidelines, be
non-binding. 67
Meeting of Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices TD/B/C.2/AC.6/1 (12
Oct. 1976).
'UNCTAD Report on 4th Session, supra note 57, at 37-38.
"Boeker, A Code for Multinationals, Wall St. J., May 28, 1976, at 8, col. 3.. Mr. Boeker was a
member of the U.S. Government team that negotiated the OECD Investment Package.
"See 15 Int'l L. Mats. 967-68 (1976); 75 DEPT. STATE BULL. 83 (1976).
"For a discussion of the situation in the UN's Commission on Transnational Corporations see
Wang, The Design of an International Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 10 J. INTr L
L. & EcoN. 319, 327-28 (1975).
"See note 15, supra.
"Davidow, supra note 8, at 26-27.
"See Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 33, 39.
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This disagreement may well be one over a matter of form rather than one of
substance. Although the developing nations have stated their preference for a
"binding" convention, it is unclear how such a result would be attained. The
mere adoption of a convention by UNCTAD would not bind other states unless
they consented to be bound via an appropriate ratification procedure.68
UNCTAD has recognized this fact69 and has postponed a final decision on the
legal character of such convention until consensus drafts are produced by the
experts on restrictive business practices70 and transfer of technology. 7
The developed nations believe that given the wide divergence in national
objectives, attitudes and experience concerning restrictive business practices
there is little likelihood that a consensus could be reached creating binding
international enforcement and adjudication machinery. They also believe that:
any attempt to enforce general principles for enterprises separately in each nation would
lead to wide variations in interpretation, procedures and sanctions, and that this would
be unfair and inequitable, would create an unstable and unpredictable atmosphere in
which enterprises would be forced to operate, and could exacerbate conflicts among
nations."1
The adoption of voluntary guidelines favored by the developed nations would,
in their view, help to harmonize international opinion and facilitate
international cooperation concerning restrictive business practices.
Despite this disagreement as to the legal nature of a consensus convention, it
is likely that the standards enunciated in any such draft would be incorporated
into many national laws, especially in those countries that presently lack any
restrictive business practice legislation.
V. The Effect on TNEs of the Absence of an
International Scheme
Thus far this article has discussed the past and current attempts to attain a
broad international agreement on the control of restrictive business practices
engaged in by TNEs. From the perspective of the management of a TNE the
most important point to be gleaned from this discussion is that there is currently
no broad international consensus. Management must confront a patchwork of
regulations, which may be national or regional, binding or voluntary, consistent
or inconsistent. Each subsidiary, branch or affiliate of the TNEs may be subject
to differing laws and policies. Simultaneously, the whole enterprise may be
subject to attempts at extraterritorial regulation by one or more nations. Three
"'See, e.g., Address by the Secretary-General of the UN to UNCTAD's Third Session TD/151
(1972); 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 673-77 (2d ed. 1973); D.
BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
"UNCTAD Secretariat, The Legal Nature and Possible Form of the Code 99-102, TD/B/C.6/
AC.1/2/Supp. 1 (5 May 1975).
"
0See UNCTAD Report on 4th Session, supra note 57, at 10.
7 Id. at 37.
"See Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 33.
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examples of the resultant international clashes will suffice to illustrate the
TNEs' regulatory dilemma.
A. Swiss Watch Case73
In 1954 the U.S. government sued several American and Swiss watch
manufacturers for conspiring to eliminate competition in the production, sale,
and trade of watches, watch parts and watchmaking machinery. The
defendants had allegedly entered into a series of agreements beginning in 1931,
designed to protect the Swiss watch industry from the development and growth
of competitive watch industries in the United States and elsewhere. The primary
means of effectuating this conspiracy was an agreement entered into in
Switzerland termed the "Collective Convention." The Swiss government had
encouraged and approved these private agreements. It had also passed
legislation in aid of the Convention signatories. For example, any signatory who
breached any of the Convention's provisions was, under Swiss law, subject to
private sanctions provided in the Convention, and nonsignatories were
subjected to certain price and other regulations.
The defendants claimed that the United States court should not assume
jurisdiction over their activities on the ground that the American antitrust laws
cannot be applied to acts of sovereign governments. In making this contention,
they apparently relied on the fact that the agreements were entered into and
became effective in Switzerland, and were sanctioned by Swiss law. The court
responded that if "the defendants" activities had been required by Swiss law,
this court could indeed do nothing.7" However, the challenged agreements in
this case had been formulated privately without compulsion on the part of the
Swiss government. The fact that the private agreements were recognized or even
approved of by the Swiss government was insufficient to "convert what is
essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting
from foreign governmental action compelling the defendants' activities." The
court held, "a United States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and
contracts abroad, if . . . such acts and contracts have a substantial and
material effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce."',
The Court's final judgment was modified after a compromise was reached
between the United States and Swiss governments.7 6 The latter had threatened
to institute a case against the former in the International Court of Justice if a
satisfactory agreement was not achieved. 77
"United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), ordermodified, 1965TradeCas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Fora detailed
discussion see Haight, The Swiss Watch Case, in Rahl supra note 35, at 311-63.
1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 at 77,456.
"Id. at 77,456-57.
1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"Haight, supra note 73, at 311.
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B. The Bechtel Case
In January 1976 the United States Department of Justice filed suit against the
Bechtel Corporation, one of the nation's largest heavy construction firms and
four of its affiliates. The Complaint alleges that these firms conspired to boycott
individuals and American subcontractors "blacklisted" by the Arab League
countries as part of those countries' boycott of companies that do business with
Israel and "Zionist" persons or entities. The relief requested is an injunction
prohibiting the continuation of refusals to deal with blacklisted persons or
entities as subcontractors and the continuation of requirements that
subcontractors refuse to deal with blacklisted persons or firms.7" An element of
the Justice Department's theory was that the "sovereign compulsion" defense,
which immunizes anticompetitive conduct when that conduct is compelled by a
foreign sovereign, does not apply to conduct outside the territory of the foreign
sovereign, i.e., in the United States.79
The Bechtel defendants initially raised twelve defenses to the Complaint
including sovereign compulsion, the act of state doctrine80 and United States
governmental approval of the complained of activities." To further complicate
matters, the Commissioner-General of the Arab Boycott announced that the
Arab countries would not sell oil or other raw materials to American firms that
fail to abide by the rules of the boycott.2
In January 1977 the Justice Department and Bechtel agreed to a proposed
consent decree to settle the case. 83 Under the proposed decree Bechtel would
agree not to implement the Arab Boycott in the United States by screening
possible bidders and not to require others to refuse to deal with United States
companies blacklisted by the Arabs. Bechtel would be required to include
United States blacklisted persons in recommendations, evaluations or lists of
possible subcontractors or suppliers. However, if the Arab countries
"specifically and unilaterally" refuse to deal with a blacklisted person, Bechtel
would be permitted to refuse to deal with that person. In addition, Bechtel
would be permitted to enter into contracts that specify that they are to be
7 United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civil No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
"Davidow, supra note 8, at 17, Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970), appeal withdrawn (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1970). For background see
Note, Development ofthe Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REV. 889 (1971); Graziano,
Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law. 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100
(1967).
'
0 For background see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, __ U.S. -, 96 S.
Ct. 1854 (1976); Kramer, Modern Status of the Act of the State Doctrine, 12 ALR FED. 707 (1972); 6
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-54 (1968).
"Answer of Defendants, United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civil No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed April
26, 1976).
1'BNA, U.S. Export Weekly at C-2 (Oct. 19, 1976).
"The Proposed Consent Decree and the Competitive Impact Statement are reprinted in BNA,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 796, at E-I (Jan. 11, 1977).
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interpreted according to the laws of the country in which the construction
project is located, including Arab countries. The decree could be modified upon
Bechtel's application if new statutes or treaties become applicable to the Arab
Boycott or if another defendant in a similar action brought by the Justice
Department obtains a consent decree that places Bechtel at a competitive
disadvantage.
C. The Beecham Case
In March 1970 the United States Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust
suit against Bristol-Myers Co., Beecham, Inc., both of which are United States
companies, and Beecham Group Ltd. [Beecham U.K.], a British company.
Beecham, Inc., is a 90 percent owned subsidiary of Beecham U.K. The
government alleged that the three defendants combined and conspired to
restrain and monopolize trade in ampicillin and other semisynthetic penicillin
drugs by fraudulently procuring and enforcing Beecham U.K.'s United States
patent covering ampicillin and by restraining the sale of drugs in bulk form or
under other than specified trade names.84
In November 1972 the court ordered Beecham U.K. to answer certain
interrogatories relating to acquiring the United States patent and to its
negotiation of agreements with Bristol-Myers. On December 5, 1972, an official
of the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), acting under
Section 2 of that country's Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents
Act,8" issued an order to Beecham U.K. directing it not to comply with the
American court's discovery order "so far as it relates to documents in the United
Kingdom and to information to be compiled from such documents, [since the
order] constitutes an infringement of the jurisdiction which, under international
law, belongs to the United Kingdom."
In response the Department of Justice contended that Beecham U.K. should
be compelled to furnish the requested information even if such compliance
violated English law. The United States court agreed, and issued an order,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), that those factual issues
involved in the court's discovery order with which Beecham U.K. had failed to
comply would be resolved against Beecham U.K. and for the plaintiffs, pre-
cluding Beecham U.K. from introducing at trial evidence in opposition to those
claims.
'in re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Dkt. No. 50, Misc. No. 45-70 (D.D.C. filed March
19, 1970).
"
5 Ch. 87, § 2. The Section provides
(1) If it appears to any Minister of the Crown authorized to act under this section-(a) that any
person in the United Kingdom has been or may be required to produce or furnish to any
court, tribunal, or authority of a foreign country any commercial document which is not
within the territorial jurisdiction of that country, or any commercial information to be com-
piled from documents not within that jurisdiction; and (b) that the requirement constitutes
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Subsequently, Beecham U.K. requested the DTI to lift the order barring
compliance with the United States court's ruling. A new order was issued in
August 1973 that modified the earlier order by removing all restrictions on
discovery, except as "documents or information relate to any dealings between
Her Majesty's Government or any public authority in the United Kingdom and
Beechams." A letter from the DTI to Beecham U.K. accompanying the new
order stated that the Secretary decided to vary the original order after
examination of the documents and added that "[hie is concerned to give all
possible help to the Court in this matter consistent with the maintenance of
U.K. jurisdiction." Beecham U.K. filed as many interrogatory answers as it
believed it could under the DTI order and the United States district court,
noting that "Beecham [U.K.] has made a conscientious endeavor to complete
discovery. . . ." rescinded its May 1973 order that would have resolved factual
issues against Beecham U.K. 6
Because of the patchwork pattern of national attitudes in the realm of
restrictive business practices legislation illustrated by cases such as these, and
recent well publicized incidents involving international practices of TNEs, some
TNEs managers are actually encouraging the promulgation of an international
agreement that would harmonize national policies concerning restrictive
business practices.87 Several TNEs have adopted their own corporate codes of
or would constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction which, under international law,
belongs to the United Kingdom, that Minister may give directions to that person prohibit-
ing him from complying with that requirement in question, or from complying with that
requirement except to such extent or subject to such condition as may be specified in the
directions.
(2) The following Ministers are hereby authorized to act under this section, that is to say a
Secretary of State, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Aviation, the Minis-
ter of Power, and the Minister of Transport.
(3) For the purposes of this section any request or demand for the supply of a document or in-
formation which, pursuant to the requirement of any court, tribunal or authority of a
foreign country, is addressed to a person in the United Kingdom shall be treated as a
requirement to produce or furnish that document or information to that court, tribunal,
or authority, and directions under this section may be given accordingly for prohibiting
compliance therewith.
(4) In this section "commercial document" and "commercial information" mean respectively
a document or information relating to a business of any description and "document" in-
cludes any record or device by means of which material is recorded or stored.
"6Order of Jan. 22, 1974. For a discussion of this case see Note, Discovery of Documents Located
Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign
Illegality ExcuseJbrNon Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 761-66 (1974). See generally Onkelinx,
Conflict of Jnternational Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of theLaw
ofthe Situs, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 487 (1969). See Canada Acts to Bar U.S. From Acquiring Data About
Uranium Price-Fixing Group, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
"See, e.g.. Rostow, Nye & Ball, The Need for International Arrangements, in GLOBAL COMPA-
NIES 156 (G. Ball ed. 1975); Statements of Gilbert Jones, Jacques Maisonrouge and Thomas Murphy
before the Group of Eminent Persons, in Summary of the Hearings Before the Group of Eminent
Persons at 65, 79 (U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/15 [19741).
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conduct"8 and the International Chamber of Commerce has issued "Guidelines
for International Investment." 89
Many international businessmen who have not actively encouraged an
international agreement on restrictive business practices have nonetheless come
to admit the inevitability of increased governmental control of restrictive
business practices via a "binding" international agreement or "voluntary"
agreements which are subsequently incorporated into national law.90 It is clear
that attention has shifted from the question of whether there should be such an
international agreement to what type of agreement is feasible.
VII. A Prognosis
We began this article by noting the widespread agreement that the most
effective means of curtailing restrictive business practices engaged in by TNEs
would be an international convention. We have also noted that it is very unlikely
that a broad, inclusive and legally enforceable international convention with
supranational adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms will be adopted in the
foreseeable future. Three more modest types of international convention are
feasible.
A. International Consultation and Conciliation
The GATT already has adopted procedures for inter-governmental
consultations on restrictive business practices.9 ' In addition, several other
consultative vehicles presently exist.
In 1967 the Council of the OECD recommended that Member countries
undertaking a restrictive business practice proceeding or investigation involving
important interests of another Member country should notify the latter, in
advance, if possible, and should consult so as to avoid conflict. The Council also
recommended that: "where two or more Member countries proceed against a
"See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co., A Code of Worldwide Business Conduct (Oct. 1, 1974); Japan
External Trade Organization, Code of Conduct for Japanese Investors Overseas. Several codes are
collected at Stanford Research Institute, International Business Principles--Codes (SRI Int'l No. 24)
(May 1975).
"Council of the ICC (29 Nov. 1972).
"
0See, e.g., Lewin, GlobalFirms See Conduct Code Coming, THE J. OF COMMERCE, April 26, 1976,
at 1, col. 3; Clark, Multinational Firms UnderFireAll Over, Face a Changed Future, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Jannsen, Multinational Firms Grow More Amenable to UN Plans ofData
Swap, Code of Conduct, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1973, at 12, col. 2.
For discussions of other activity in this area see International Labor Office, International Principles
and Guidelines on Social Policy for Multinational Enterprises: Their Usefulness and Feasibility
(1976); World Intellectual Property Organization, Document PR/GE/II/ll (18 Dec. 1975); OR-
GANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CONSIDERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD
TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA (1974); Longworth, Writing the Rule Book, THE
SATURDAY REV., Jan. 24, 1976, at 24.
"See text at note 32, supra.
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restrictive business practice in international trade, they should endeavor to
co-ordinate their action insofar as appropriate and practicable under national
laws." 92
According to the Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division this Recommendation:
particularly as it applies to prior notification of investigations and cases, has been
extensively followed and adhered to with great care. It appears to have been quite
successful in lessening the international friction which had previously accompanied
certain antitrust investigations and prosecutions.93
In 1973 this 1967 OECD Recommendation was extended to provide a
voluntary procedure for inter-governmental consultation and conciliation. The
1973 Recommendation9 4 provides that a Member country adversely affected by
restrictive business practices engaged in by enterprises situated in another
Member country should consult with that country. If that country agrees that:
enterprises situated in its territory engage in restrictive business practices harmful to the
interests of the requesting country [it] should attempt to ensure that these enterprises
take remedial action, or should itself take whatever remedial action it considers
appropriate, in particular under its legislation on restrictive business practices, on a
voluntary basis and considering its legitimate interests;9"
If such consultations do not result in a satisfactory solution, the Member
countries may, if they so agree, submit the dispute to the OECD's Committee of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices for conciliation.96
The previously discussed 1976 OECD "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" relating to "Competition" provide that enterprises should:
be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision of information, with
competent authorities of countries whose interests are directly affected in regard to
competition issues or investigations. Provision of information should be in accordance
with safeguards normally applicable in this field.97
Several other consultative vehicles exist. These include provisions of United
States' treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with foreign
governments which obligate the signatories to consult with a view to eliminating
'"Recommendation ofthe Council of the OECD Concerning Co-Operation Between Member Coun-
tries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C [671 53 [Final]
(10 Oct. 1967). See Hearings on InternationalAspects ofAntitrustBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1967); Markert,
Developments in International Antitrust Cooperation, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 360 (1968).
'"Address by Joel Davidow, The U.S. and International Antitrust Cooperation, New York, N.Y.,
Jan. 29, 1975, at 10.
"Recommendation of the Council Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C [731 99 [Final] (20 Dec.
1973), reprinted in 19 Antitrust Bull. 283 (1974). See Zisler, The Work of the OECD Committee of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 289 (1974).
'11973 OECD Recommendation, supra note 94, at para. 3.
"Id. at para. 5.
"See note 7 supra, at para. (4). Concern has been expressed that these procedures might lead to
public identification of specific corporate malefactors. Egan, Caution Voiced by U.S. On Multina-
tionals Code, Wash. Post, July 8, 1976 § E, at 13, col. 5.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 1
Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices 27
tie harmful effects of restrictive business practices98 and bilateral consultation
agreements between the United States and Canada99 and the United States and
West Germany. 100
UNCTAD's Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices has been considering proposals from the developed and developing
countries for consultation procedures. However, to date no agreement has been
reached. 101
Even if UNCTAD is eventually able to achieve a consensus on an
international consultative procedure such an agreement would not solve the
basic problem of inconsistent national restrictive business practices policies. 102
One leading commentator has averred that such governmental consultations do
not resolve the problem of the TNE's exposure under United States antitrust law
to treble damage actions brought by private parties.103
B. A Model Law for Developing Countries
Some progress has been made within UNCTAD in formulating a model law
on restrictive business practices for developing countries. 10 The May 1976
Ministerial Meeting of UNCTAD called for the elaboration of a model law or
laws on restrictive business practices based on the previous work of the Second
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices. °0
Such a model law presumably would be incorporated into the national laws of
several developing countries. Thus, although it would not be an international
agreement, it would help to harmonize national laws and thereby to reduce
international conflicts.
"See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Italian Republic, Feb. 2,
1948, art. XVIII, para. 3, 63 Stat. 2255, 2282 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (effective July 26, 1949); and
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29,
1954, art. XVIII, para. 1., (1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (effective July 14, 1956). For dis-
cussions see Rahl supra note 35, at 448-51; Haight, The Restrictive Business Practices Clause in U.S.
Treaties: An Antitrust Tranquilizer for International Trade, 70 YALE L. J. 240 (1960).
"U.S. Dep't of Justice News Release, Nov. 3, 1969, in 5 CCH, Trade Reg. Rep. 50,112; Steven-
son, "Extraterritoriality" in Canadian-U.S. Relations, 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425 (1970).
'°°Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business
Practices (signed June 23, 1976) (effective Sept. 11, 1976), reprinted in 5 CCH, Trade Reg. Rep.
50.283. See Dep't State Press Release No. 330 (June 25, 1976).
"'Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 23-26.
"'See. e.g.. United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (restrictive
business practices clauses of FCN treaties do not provide exclusive remedy available to the United
States).
"°'Timberg, supra note 54, at 168, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S.
100 (1969). 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
"'Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 5, at 31.
'°
5 UNCTAD Report on 4th Session, supra note 57, at 11.
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C. Convention Limited to Practices that
Affect International Trade
One highly desirable type of international convention would be one limited to
restrictive business practices that affect international trade. Such an agreement
would not attempt to provide uniform standards for the numerous restrictive
business practices that affect only domestic commerce or for practices that
traditionally have not been considered within the scope of restrictive business
practices legislation. Such a convention would deal with effects on competition
in international trade and include necessary investigative and enforcement
procedures. 10 6 It would not resolve all of the problems stemming from
inconsistent national legislation, but it could significantly reduce international
conflicts concerning extraterritoriality.
It is unfortunate to conclude that agreement on such a convention appears to
be unlikely in the near future. In the meantime, it would be unrealistic to expect
more than the development of further consultation agreements and a model law
for developing countries. It is clear that the uncertainties affecting this area of
the law will linger to perplex and challenge us for some time.
'For proposals see Timberg. supra note 54, at 168-84; Fine, The Control of Restrictive Business
Practices in International Trade-A Viable Proposal fbr an International Trade Organization, 7
IN'' L LAW. 635 (1973); Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GA TTfor Investment: A Proposal for
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POL. INT 'L Bus. 295 (1970); Furnish, supra
note 42.
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